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ABSTRACT
Although mutual funds exhibit little ability to persistently outperform their peers, money flows into
funds with the highest past returns. Berk and Green (2004) rationalize these patterns by arguing that
more-skilled managers manage more assets but, because of diseconomies of scale, generate the same
expected returns as less-skilled managers. To identify the causal impact of fund size on performance,
we exploit the fact that small differences in mutual fund returns can cause discrete changes in Morningstar
ratings that, in turn, generate discrete differences in mutual fund size. Our regression discontinuity
estimates yield little evidence that fund size erodes fund returns.
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eric.zitzewitz@dartmouth.edu  The  mutual  fund  literature  is  responsible  for  two  well-known  stylized 
facts.  The first fact, based on more than thirty years of research, is that actively 
managed mutual fund returns exhibit little ability to persistently outperform their 
peers  (e.g.,  Jensen  (1968)  and  Carhart  (1997)).  The  second  fact  is  that  new 
money flows disproportionately into those actively managed funds with the high-
est past returns (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998)).  
The traditional academic interpretations of these facts are that fund managers are 
unskilled and fund investors are unsophisticated.   
  Berk and Green (2004) challenge these interpretations.  They argue that 
both facts are consistent with a model that combines skilled managers with dis-
economies of scale in asset management.  In their model, rational investors chase 
performance to the point that expected future returns are equalized across funds.  
In  equilibrium,  more-skilled  managers  manage  more  assets  but—precisely  be-
cause of the diseconomies of scale associated with managing more assets—earn 
the same expected future return as their less-skilled peers.  Berk (2005) goes fur-
ther, arguing that the traditional interpretations of these stylized facts are “myths” 
and that the Berk-Green model shows that “most active managers are skilled.”  
Berk and Green’s interpretations have quite different implications for our view of 
financial markets (i.e., they are easier to beat than we thought) and investors (i.e., 
they are harder to fool than we thought), which, in turn, have important implica-
tions for public policy, and for the evaluation of fund managers.  However, the 
empirical relevance of the Berk-Green model depends crucially on the degree of 
scale diseconomies in asset management.   
  Our goal in this paper is to measure the causal impact of fund size on fund 
performance.  To motivate our empirical strategy, it is helpful to view the existing 
evidence through the lens of Berk and Green’s (2004) model.  In a study that is 
both representative and widely cited, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004, here-
after CHHK) regress mutual fund returns on lagged fund size and other observ-  2 
able characteristics.  They find that a fund that is a log order of magnitude larger 
earns risk-adjusted returns that are 2 to 3 basis points per month lower.
1  If we 
were to interpret this difference as the causal effect of fund size on returns, we 
would conclude that diseconomies could not be masking a meaningful amount of 
performance persistence.  First, we know that a fund that outperforms its peers by 
one log percentage point this year will be 2-5 log percentage points larger next 
year (one log percentage point from returns mechanically increasing assets, and 
the other 1-4 log percentage points from the flow-performance relation).
2  Second, 
CHHK's estimate implies that a fund that is one log percentage point larger will 
earn returns that are about 0.003 log percentage points lower over the next 12 
months.  Combining these two estimates implies that a fund that outperforms its 
peers by one percentage point this year will suffer a 0.6-1.5 basis point penalty 
next year.  In other words, if we interpret CHHK's estimate as an estimate of the 
causal effect of fund size on performance, the effect described in Berk and Green 
will  cause  us  to  underestimate  an  annual  AR(1)  coefficient  by  0.006-0.015.  
Given that we estimate the annual AR(1) coefficient to be approximately 0.1, the 
estimated diseconomies of scale in CHHK are too small to meaningfully affect 
our views about the level of return persistence. 
  However, it is important to note that the calculation above is not an appro-
priate test of the Berk-Green model.  If fund size is endogenously related to ex-
pected future returns, in equilibrium, fund size will be uncorrelated with future 
returns, thereby frustrating standard approaches to estimate diseconomies of scale.  
Even if we allow for the possibility that fund sizes are out of equilibrium, the es-
timates in CHHK (and other studies) will underestimate the actual diseconomies 
                                                            
1 Chen, Hong, and Kubik (2008) and Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010) estimate similar partial 
correlations between fund size and fund returns, although neither paper is focused on the relation 
between fund size and returns.   
2 We take our range from the graphs of the inflow-performance relationship for the "young" (<2 
years) and "old" (>10 years) funds in Chevalier and Ellison (1997), but these slopes have been 
replicated in many other studies.   3 
of scale if larger funds have more-skilled managers.
3   
Indeed, Berk-Green effects may analogously inform the interpretation of 
any study involving fund, or even trade, size. For example, Edelen, Evans, and 
Kadlec (2007) and Yan (2008) provide evidence that trading costs are higher in 
larger funds, likely depressing returns. In a Berk-Green model, larger funds have 
more skilled managers, so if skill mitigates trading costs, the partial correlation 
should  yield  a  conservative  estimate  of  the  causal  effect  of  size  in  increasing 
costs. A recent literature (summarized in Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008) finds 
that corporate and municipal bonds trading costs decline sharply with trade size. 
While this relationship may largely reflect a causal, "economy of scale," relation-
ship, the average client in a large trade is likely more skilled at search and nego-
tiation  in  dealer  markets,  and  this  may  contribute  to  the  size-cost  correlation.  
Consistent with this possibility, Zitzewitz (2011) provides evidence that clients in 
large corporate bond trades are more likely to be insurance companies and that 
insurance companies trade at lower costs than the average client, controlling for 
trade size.  Finally, Gutierrez, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) find no evidence of a size-
return correlation for bond funds, and suggest that the difference with the results 
for  stock  funds  reflects  differences  in  economies  of  scale  in  trading  costs  for 
stocks and bonds. An alternative, Berk-Green hypotheses might be that the size-
skill relationship is stronger for bond funds, where skill may be more important or 
more readily inferred from returns.   
To identify diseconomies of scale in asset management, separately from 
the effects of other factors that covary with size, we require a natural experi-
ment—something that causes an increase in fund size for reasons that are related 
                                                            
3 Controlling for additional fund characteristics, as most studies comparing large and small funds 
do, does not change the fundamental prediction that the partial correlation between fund size and 
expected returns should be zero, even in the presence of scale diseconomies.  When observable 
fund characteristics impact expected returns, investors should allocate dollars across funds such 
that expected returns are equal conditional on those characteristics.   4 
to future returns only through diseconomies of scale.
 We identify such an experi-
ment using a regression discontinuity approach.  Our insight is that small changes 
in fund returns can have discontinuous impacts on fund flows through their im-
pact on the fund’s Morningstar rating.  For example, as a fund’s within-category 
Morningstar performance ranking increases from the 89
th percentile to the 90
th 
percentile, it’s Morningstar rating increases from four stars to five stars.  Under 
the assumption that manager skill varies continuously across each of the Morn-
ingstar rating thresholds, we can use high frequency data on Morningstar per-
formance rankings to identify the casual impact of Morningstar rating thresholds 
on fund inflows.  Then, because this source of fund inflows is uncorrelated with 
manager skill (and other factors affecting future returns), we can use these inflows 
to identify the causal impact of fund size on fund performance.  In other words, 
we are using small deviations from the rational behavior assumed in the Berk-
Green model to measure the extent of diseconomies of scale. 
  We have four main empirical findings, based on monthly data from Morn-
ingstar that covers virtually every mutual fund in operation between December 
1996 and August 2009.  First, in our first-stage regressions, we show that mutual 
funds just above the threshold for a Morningstar rating receive incremental net 
flows over the next six months that are equal to approximately 2.5 percent of as-
sets under management.  Second, looking out over the next 6-24 months, we find 
little evidence of diseconomies of scale.  Our reduced-form estimates of the im-
pact of incremental net flows on returns are largely positive during the first six 
months and largely negative during the subsequent eighteen months, but none of 
the estimates are statistically different from zero.  In other words, within the full 
sample of funds, the exogenous variation in fund size that we exploit has little 
impact on fund returns. 
  Third, when we shift our focus to subsamples based on investment objec-
tives (e.g., small-cap equity funds or sector funds), we continue to find little evi-  5 
dence of diseconomies of scale.  For example, despite the fact that incremental 
inflows into sector funds reach 14.0 percentage points by month 24, and despite 
the fact that sector funds should be a good category in which to test for disecono-
mies of scale, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the diseconomies implied by 
our first-stage and reduced-form regressions equal those obtained via standard 
OLS regressions.  The only subsamples for which we can reject the hypothesis 
that the IV estimate equals the OLS estimate are mid-cap equity funds and mu-
nicipal bond funds.
4  And, within both of those subsamples, our IV estimates im-
ply (small) positive economies of scale.   
  Finally, we adjust standard OLS estimates of performance persistence for 
potential diseconomies of scale.  Because we find little evidence of diseconomies 
of scale, our median corrected AR(1) estimate of 0.088 is virtually identical to our 
uncorrected estimate of 0.090.  Moreover, the upper bound of the 95% confidence 
interval for the corrected persistence coefficient is 0.137 in the full sample of 
funds, and even lower in some subsamples.  Based on our regression discontinuity 
estimates, it is hard to attribute the well-known lack of performance persistence to 
diseconomies of scale. 
  The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we de-
scribe the process that Morningstar uses to determine ratings, as well as our data.  
In Section II, we outline our empirical strategy and discuss our identifying as-
sumption.  In Section III, we show that share classes (and funds) with return pat-
terns that place them just above a Morningstar ratings threshold receive higher 
flows than share classes (and funds) with return patterns that place them just be-
low the same Morningstar ratings threshold.  In Section IV, we use the findings 
                                                            
4 One might argue that when OLS and IV estimates are equal, there is no scientific contribution 
from having done the IV.  We disagree, particularly when there is a plausible alternative explana-
tion for the OLS result that the IV approach rules out. Two famous examples come from the litera-
tures on smoking and lung cancer (e.g., Doll, 1998) and wages and education (e.g., Card, 1999). In 
both cases, initial correlative evidence was dismissed on the grounds that there were very plausible 
confounding factors, and it was left to later work to establish a causal relationship.   6 
from Section III to test for diseconomies of scale, both overall and within samples 
of funds focused on specific asset classes.  In Section V, we adjust estimates of 
return persistence for diseconomies of scale.  In Section VI, we conclude. 
I.  Morningstar Ratings and Fund Characteristics 
Our identification strategy relies on the discrete nature of Morningstar ratings.  It 
also relies on the fact that, because Morningstar ratings are based on past returns, 
we can identify funds near rating thresholds.  In this section, we describe how 
Morningstar ratings are determined.  We then describe our sample. 
A.  Morningstar Ratings 
Morningstar rates mutual fund share classes on a scale that ranges from one star 
(the lowest possible rating) to five stars (the highest possible rating).  The rating 
assigned  to  each  mutual  fund  share  class  depends  on  its  relative  performance 
within its Morningstar-determined investment category over the prior 3 years, 5 
years,  and  10  years,  “after  adjusting  for  risk  and  accounting  for  all  sales 
charges.”
5  Morningstar does not rate mutual fund share classes that are less than 
three years old. 
  For mutual fund share classes between the age of three and five years, the 
Morningstar rating depends entirely on its relative performance over the prior 36 
months.  “Within each Morningstar Category, the top 10% of funds receive five 
stars, the next 22.5% four stars, the middle 35% three stars, the next 22.5% two 
stars, and the bottom 10% receive one star.”
6  Therefore, small differences in past 
                                                            
5 Morningstar changed various detailed of its ratings process in June 2002.  See Blume (1998) for 
a  description  of  the  rating  system  used  from  1996-2002  and  
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/DataDefs/FundRatingsAndRisk.html for Morningstar’s descrip-
tion of their current ratings process.  The most significant change was that the number of Morn-
ingstar Categories increased from four on May 2002 (Domestic Equity, International Equity, Tax-
able Bonds, and Munipal Bonds) to 48 on June 2002, eventually growing to 81 in August 2009.  
The new Morningstar Categories better reflect actual investment styles (e.g., distinguishing do-
mestic equity funds that focus on large-cap growth from those that focus on small-cap value).  
Morningstar also changed the method used to risk-adjusting returns, and made the relative impor-
tance of 5 and 10-year returns depend on whether a fund had experienced style drift. 
6 See http://quicktake.morningstar.com/DataDefs/FundRatingsAndRisk.html.   7 
returns, such as going from the 10
th percentile to the 11
th percentile, or from the 
89
th percentile to the 90
th percentile, result in discrete changes in Morningstar rat-
ings.  These discrete changes are evident in Figure 1, in which we plot Morning-
star ratings for all share classes that are less than 5 years old against Morning-
star’s  risk-adjusted,  within  category  return  percentile.    Figure  1  also  provides 
graphical evidence that (residual) flows increase sharply around ratings thresh-
olds.
7  (We present more formal evidence in Section III.) 
  For share classes between the age of 5 and 10, Morningstar determines 
separate ratings based on the prior 36 months and the prior 60 months, and “aver-
ages” the underlying ratings to calculate an overall integer rating.  In Figure 2, we 
show how relative performance over the prior 36 and 60 months maps into a share 
classes' overall rating.  The pattern reveals that Morningstar calculates a fund's 
overall rating as a 60-40 average of the 5-year and 3-year integer ratings, causing 
it to “round up” when the better performance is over the longer horizon.
8  For ex-
ample, a share class with a 36-month return that puts it at the 89
th percentile (four 
stars) and a 60-month return that puts it at the 90
th percentile (five stars), receives 
an overall rating of five stars.  In contrast, a share class with a 36-month return 
that puts it at the 90
th percentile (five stars) and a 60-month return that puts it at 
the 89
th percentile (four stars), receives an overall rating of four stars.  To the ex-
tent that we’re willing to assume that the managers of these two funds are simi-
larly skilled (conditional on current assets under management), and that the five-
star fund receives higher residual flows, we can study the impact of these incre-
mental flows on future returns. 
                                                            
7 The residual flows in Figure 1 come from versions of the baseline flow regression in Section III 
that omit the Morningstar within-category percentile ranking and discontinuity dummy variable. 
8 After June 2002, Morningstar began giving older history less weight when funds had experi-
enced style drift.  To make Figure 2 more transparent, we exclude these funds from the picture.  
Depending on how much style drift was experienced and when it was experienced, a fund's 3-year 
history can receive more than 50 percent of the weight, causing the rounding to occur in the other 
direction.   8 
  While the staircase boundaries between overall ratings may strike readers 
as an unusual methodological choice by Morningstar, it is helpful from the per-
spective of our research, since this approach increases the number of funds that 
are very close to a rating boundary.  For share classes that are more than 10 years 
old, Morningstar’s overall rating depends on the average of the 3-year, 5-year, 
and 10-year ratings.  For these share classes, thresholds between ratings are con-
ceptually similar to those in Figure 2.  However, because these thresholds relate to 
three underlying ratings, they must be plotted in three dimensions. 
B.  Sample Construction 
To study the impact of mutual fund flows on mutual fund returns, we obtain data 
from Morningstar Principia CDs.  Our sample consists of all open-end mutual 
funds that have at least one share class rated by Morningstar.  Because Morning-
star does not rate share classes that are less than three years old, mutual funds en-
ter our sample when their oldest share class reaches three years of age.  The fact 
that we only study funds in the time period in which they appear on a Morningstar 
CD limits the influence of incubation bias (Evans (2010)) on our results.  While 
incubation bias might help to explain why funds appearing on a Morningstar CD 
for the first time have average Morningstar ratings about a quarter point above 
older funds, our analysis of future inflows and performance uses only non-back-
filled data.  Consequently, our estimates of scale diseconomies should be unaf-
fected by incubation bias. 
  Our data begin in December 1996 and end in August 2009.
9  Because mu-
tual fund share classes can earn different Morningstar ratings and experience dif-
ferent inflows, the unit of observation in our initial analysis of inflows is the share 
class.  As any scale diseconomies would occur at the fund (portfolio) level, how-
                                                            
9 We have been unable to obtain data for 12 of the 36 months between January 1997 and Decem-
ber 1999.  The missing months are January 1997, February 1997, April 1997, May 1997, July 
1997, August 1997, October 1997, November 1997, January 1998, July 1998, January 1999, and 
November 1999.   9 
ever, in most of our analysis we aggregate variables to the fund level, weighting 
each share class in proportion to its assets under management in the prior month.  
In practice, the exact approach we take to weighting share classes has little influ-
ence on the results because the average fund gets 84 percent of its assets from its 
largest share class. 
  Finally, because Morningstar within-category percentile rankings do not 
distinguish between actively and passively managed mutual funds, we include the 
share classes of index funds in our sample when calculating within-category per-
centile rankings.  However, we exclude index funds from all inflow and return 
regressions. 
10 
C.  Summary Statistics 
In Table 1, we report fund-level summary statistics for the full sample of 491,863 
fund-month observations.  We also use asset-weighted average Morningstar rat-
ings to assign fund-level ratings, and report summary statistics for each fund-level 
rating category.  Looking across these categories, we see that funds with higher 
ratings tend to be larger and come from larger families.  Funds with higher ratings 
also tend to charge lower average fees (both in month t and month t+12), tend to 
offer fewer share classes, and are less likely to charge a sales load.  Of course, 
differences in fees and sales loads follow, at least in part, from the fact that Morn-
ingstar ratings are based on returns measured net of fees and loads. 
  The most interesting differences between funds with higher and lower rat-
ings involve future flows and future returns.  Consistent with investors responding 
to Morningstar ratings (or to the return histories underlying them), we find that 
funds with higher ratings receive higher net flows over the next 24 months.  Rela-
                                                            
10 Conceptually, because index funds should not experience diseconomies of scale, including them 
in our reduced-form regressions could cause us to underestimate the extent of diseconomies of 
scale.  Practically, however, few index funds would have been included in our reduced-form re-
gressions because the vast majority of index funds are rated three stars, with returns well away 
from thresholds for two or four stars.    10 
tive to other funds in their Morningstar category, the typical five-star funds grows 
by 23 log percentage points over this period, while the typical one-star funds 
shrinks by 18 log percentage points.  The results presented later imply that of this 
41  log  percentage  point  difference,  about  9  log  percentage  point  represents  a 
causal effect of the difference in Morningstar ratings on flows, with the remainder 
being due to investors responding directly to observable fund characteristics in-
cluded in Morningstar’s ratings (e.g., past returns, risk, and loads), other observ-
able characteristics correlated with the ratings (e.g., low expenses), or unobserv-
able characteristics correlated with the ratings (e.g., marketing efforts).
11 
  Consistent with prior work on the predictive power of Morningstar ratings 
(e.g., Blake and Morey (2009)), we find that one-star funds underperform other 
funds over the next 24 months, but find little difference in the future performance 
of other funds.  The fact that 5-star and 2-star funds perform approximately as 
well in the future despite 5-star funds experiencing greater inflows does not nec-
essarily imply the absence of scale diseconomies, however.  In the Berk-Green 
model, the 5-star funds attract more inflows because they have more skilled man-
agers, and this skill allows the funds to match the 2-star funds’ returns despite 
managing more assets.  For a test for scale diseconomies to be valid in the Berk-
Green model, it needs to exploit a source of variation in inflows that is not caused 
by or correlated with manager skill.  Fortunately, the discontinuities in the Morn-
ingstar ranking function generate this type of variation. 
II.  Overview of RD and our Identification Strategy 
In order to measure the causal impact of fund size on fund performance, we must 
identify variation in fund size that is uncorrelated with manager skill.  In markets 
                                                            
11  Prior work examining the relationship between fund inflows and Morningstar ratings uses ob-
servable variables to control for these factors.  For example, when they include fund fixed effects, 
Del Guerico and Tkac (2008) continue to find a positive association between stars and flows.  As a 
robustness check, in Section IV.D., we use changes in Morningstar ratings to estimate the extent 
of scale diseconomies.   11 
with perfectly rational, informed investors, this variation should be impossible to 
come by.  We use a regression discontinuity approach that exploits the fact that 
mutual funds with past returns immediately above a Morningstar rating threshold 
receive a discretely higher rating than mutual funds with past returns immediately 
below the threshold.  To the extent that investors place positive weight on Morn-
ingstar  ratings,  funds  with  risk-adjusted  returns  immediately  above  a  ratings 
threshold are likely to receive significantly more inflows than funds with risk-
adjusted returns immediately below the threshold.
12 
  Our analysis proceeds in two stages.  In the first-stage regressions, we es-
timate the impact of rating thresholds on future flows.  Then, we use reduced-
form regressions to estimate the impact of rating thresholds on future returns.  The 
identifying assumption is that while inflow will vary sharply at each threshold, the 
other fund characteristics that might be related to future returns will vary continu-
ously.
13  Under this assumption, our first-stage and reduced-form estimates allows 
us to measure the extent of diseconomies of scale.  
  More formally, our analysis focuses on actively managed mutual funds 
just above and below each rating threshold.  For example, with respect to the 
threshold between four stars and five stars, our first-stage regression predicts log 
net flows as function of the within-category percentile ranking used to determine 
                                                            
12 In the Berk-Green model, investors use risk-adjusted past returns to directly infer manager skill.  
Because perfectly informed investors will not place any weight on Morningstar ratings, flows will 
vary continuously across Morningstar rating thresholds.  To motivate our RD approach, consider a 
version of the Berk-Green model where many investors observe Morningstar stars rather than risk-
adjusted returns, and make inferences about manager skill based on the average characteristics of 
funds with that rating.  In this version of the model, average performance will be equalized across 
the different Morningstar ratings.  However, there will be flow discontinuities at rating boundaries 
and—because funds just over a boundary will have similar managerial skill to those just under it—
the incremental flows will cause funds just over a boundary to underperform.  Of course, given 
this underperformance, savvy investors who directly observe returns will rationally choose to in-
vest in funds just below ratings boundaries.  Therefore, for the flow discontinuities that we ob-
serve in the data to exist, the number of savvy investors must be limited. 
13 Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2009) provide excellent overviews of the 
regression discontinuity approach.    12 
Morningstar ratings, a dummy variable that indicates whether the within-category 
percentile ranking the share class i of fund j in month t is above the five star rating 
threshold, and controls, including multiple controls for past performance and past 
flows. 
 
     
Flowi,j,t+1 = δ1stthresholdi,j,t + λ1strankingi,j,t + β1stXi,j,t +ηi,j,t      (1)   
where  δ1st  measures  the  discontinuous  flow  effect  associated  with  the  ratings 
threshold.
14 
  In many RD settings, the “forcing variable”, which determines whether an 
observation is above or below the threshold, is exogenous.
15  In our setting, the 
within-category percentile ranking is not exogenous.  However, our identifying 
assumption is that, because all managers are trying to maximize relative perform-
ance, manager skill will vary continuously across the threshold for a higher rating.  
In other words, while we allow for the possibility that managers with slightly 
higher returns are slightly more skilled, our identification strategy assumes that 
skill does not jump in a discontinuous way at the threshold between ratings.  The 
fact that thresholds for different Morningstar ratings depend on within-category 
performance rankings over as many as three investment horizons increases our 
confidence that the distribution of manager skill is smoother than the distribution 
of Morningstar ratings.
16   
                                                            
14 Following the advice in Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we experimented with more flexible ap-
proaches to controlling for the ranking variable, but found that the results varied little from the 
local linear approach. 
15 For example, to study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on firms costs and earnings, Iliev 
(2010) exploits the fact that U.S. firms with a public float below $75 million in 2002, 2003, or 
2004 were allowed to delay compliance with Section 404 until well after the November 2004 date 
on which slightly larger firms were required to comply. 
16  An common concern in regression discontinuity studies is manipulation of the forcing variable. 
In our setting,. our identification approach would be threatened if funds with more skilled manag-
ers were also able to manipulate their returns in order to place just above a Morningstar cutoff.  
We conduct several tests for and find no evidence of such manipulation.  We test for discontinui-
ties in the density of risk-adjusted returns around Morningstar cuttoffs (McCrary (2008)) and for 
month-to-month persistence in the discontinuity variable (controlling for the forcing variable).    13 
  To estimate fund-level flows, we focus on the discontinuity measure for 
the fund’s largest share class.  Then, we estimate a reduced-form regression 
 
     
Returni,j,t+1 = δrfthresholdi,j,t + λrfrankingi,j,t + βrfXi,j,t +ηi,j,t   (2) 
where δrf measures the causal effect of ratings thresholds on returns.  Under the 
assumption that the causal effect of ratings thresholds on flows is unrelated to dif-
ferences in manager skill, δrf will capture any diseconomies of scale associated 
with these flows.  Finally, we can estimate the causal impact of flows on returns 
as the ratio of δrf to δ1st.  The more negative this IV-style estimate, the larger the 
implied diseconomies of scale. 
III.  Impact of Morningstar Ratings on Flows 
In this section, we present evidence that Morningstar ratings have a causal impact 
on investor flows.  Because our identification strategy exploits the discreteness of 
Morningstar ratings, and because different share classes of the same mutual fund 
can receive different Morningstar ratings, we begin by studying the impact of 
Morningstar ratings on net flows at the share class level.  Consistent with equation 
(1), our general approach is to regress log net flows of share class i in month t+1 
on its Morningstar percentile ranking in month t, which is our local linear control, 
and a dummy variable that indicates whether share class i is above the threshold 
for a particular rating in month t.  Under the assumption that manager skill varies 
continuously across the rating threshold, the dummy variable will capture incre-
mental flows into the higher-rated fund that are uncorrelated with manager skill. 
  To quantify these discontinuous flow effects, in Table 2, we estimate sepa-
rate regressions for each rating thresholds (i.e. one star versus two stars, …, four 
stars versus five stars), and a pooled regression that combines all four thresholds.  
In each case, the sample is restricted to those share classes that are within five 
                                                                                                                                                                  
We also test for discontinuities in lagged flows and returns and the control variables.  These re-
sults are presented in an Appendix.    14 
percentiles of a rating threshold.
17  For example, when we focus on the threshold 
between four and five stars, we restrict the sample to share classes with Morning-
star rankings between the 85
th and 95
th percentiles.  We further restrict the sample 
to actively managed funds by excluding any fund that Morningstar identifies as an 
index fund. 
  In addition to the variables that we report in Table 2, “Baseline” regres-
sions control for the lagged log size of the share class, portfolio, and family, port-
folio turnover, expense ratio, and the presence of loads (front, deferred, and trail-
ing).
18  Because our sample includes the full range of Morningstar categories (i.e., 
large-cap equity, sector funds, corporate bond funds, etc.), we include a separate 
fixed effect for each Morningstar category each month.  This allows us to com-
pare funds to their peers.  In the regressions with “Additional Controls”, we sup-
plement the Morningstar percentile ranking variable with controls for Morning-
star's measure of risk-adjusted returns, lagged log returns from t-12 to t-1, t-24 to 
t-13, and t-36 to t-25, and lagged log inflows from t-12 to t-1 and t-3 to t-1.  Be-
cause mutual funds with multiple share classes can appear multiple times in the 
same month, we cluster standard errors on the fund.
19 
  The estimated coefficients on the discontinuity dummy variable are posi-
tive and statistically significant for each of the four ratings thresholds, and for the 
pooled regression that includes all four ratings thresholds.  In the baseline regres-
                                                            
17 In the Appendix, we present robustness checks that vary this five percentile bandwidth. 
18 Edelen (1999) finds that investor flow volatility is associated with lower fund returns and higher 
trading activity. The incremental net flow caused by Morningstar ratings may be accompanied by 
higher gross flow that stimulates trading. While we lack Edelen's hand-collected data on gross 
flows,  we  do  not  find  evidence  of  discontinuities  in  future  portfolio  turnover  at  Morningstar 
boundaries, and including portfolio turnover as a control does not materially affect our results.  
19 Given the large number of regressions estimated in the study and the large number of category-
time fixed effects included in each model, it is not practical to cluster standard errors on both fund 
and month (e.g., following Petersen (2009)).  However, when we experimented with two-way 
clustering on fund and month, we found that the standard errors were quite similar to those re-
ported in the paper.  This is likely because all of our regressions include time fixed effects and 
because the distribution of Morningstar ratings is stable across time periods.  We also found that 
our results were robust to clustering standard errors by family instead of by fund.   15 
sions, the estimates range from 0.337 log percentage points at the boundary be-
tween 1 star and 2 stars (significant at the 5-percent level) to 0.946 log percentage 
points at the boundary between 4 stars and 5 stars (significant at the 1-percent 
level).  When we include additional controls for past returns and past flows, the 
estimated coefficients decline, but only slightly.  For example, within the stacked 
regression,  the  estimated  coefficient  falls  from  0.518  to  0.432  log  percentage 
points, but remains statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  In other words, 
share classes that are just above the Morningstar ratings threshold this month re-
ceive an additional 0.432 log percentage points in net flow next month, compared 
to share classes that are just below the threshold. 
  If a share class were to maintain its Morningstar percentile ranking just 
above the threshold for an entire year, this would translate into an additional an-
nual net flow of 5.154 log percentage points.  However, this persistence would 
also call into question our identifying assumption that manager skill varies con-
tinuously across rating thresholds.  In the last two columns of Table 2, we test this 
assumption by changing the dependent variable from log net flows in month t+1 
to log net flows in month t.  If the discontinuity in flows in month t+1 is due to a 
discontinuity in flow-producing fund characteristics at the start of month t (rather 
than to the higher Morningstar rating), we should also find discontinuity effects in 
month t.  Importantly for our empirical strategy, when we shift our focus to cur-
rent-month flows, only five of the ten estimated coefficients on the discontinuity 
dummy variable are positive, and only one is statistically significant from zero (at 
the  10-percent  level).    These  results  strongly  suggest  that  the  discontinuity  in 
flows in month t+1 is solely due to the higher Morningstar rating.  Overall, the 
results in Table 2 provide the “first stage” that we need to study the causal impact 
of flows on performance. 
  Of course, to test for diseconomies of scale, we need to study the impact 
of fund-level flows on fund-level performance.  In Table 3, we study the impact   16 
of Morningstar ratings on log net flows at the fund level.  Because many funds 
have more than one share class, we need a measure of incremental flows that is 
aggregated across all of fund j’s share classes.  Most funds have a main share 
class that contains most of the assets (traditionally the “A” class for load funds 
and the “Investor” class for no-load funds).  Because other share classes have the 
same return gross of fees and expenses, within-fund differences in returns (and 
Morningstar percentile rankings) reflect differences in fees and expenses.  The 
Morningstar rating of the largest share class is generally the one marketed to po-
tential investors, as other share classes either have lower ratings due to higher fees 
(e.g., B, C, and Service share classes) or impose restrictions on who can purchase 
them (e.g., Institutional share classes).  Our approach is to focus on the disconti-
nuity and ranking variables for fund j’s largest share class.
20 
  The estimated coefficients in the first two columns of Table 3 are qualita-
tively similar to those in Table 2, with slightly smaller magnitudes because the 
denominator is fund-level assets rather than share class-level assets.  Seven of the 
ten coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels, with the lack of a discontinuity between one and two stars being the major 
exception.  Importantly, we continue to find little evidence of a discontinuity in 
current month flows. 
  Again, the coefficient estimates from the regressions with additional con-
trols are slightly smaller than the baseline estimates, but the differences are never 
statistically significant.  Because we find the strongest evidence of flow disconti-
nuities at the 3/4 star and 4/5 star boundaries, we focus on these boundaries in 
later tables.  Figure 3A provides graphical evidence of the discontinuity in future 
                                                            
20 As an alternative, we experimented with taking the highest Morningstar rating and ranking vari-
able across all share classes, on the assumption that this would be the rating marketed to investors.  
We found very similar results.   17 
inflows at each rating threshold.
21  Figure 3B provides graphical evidence of the 
lack of the discontinuity in current month inflows.  In the appendix, we provide 
evidence of a lack of discontinuities in the control variables, which further sup-
ports our identification strategy. 
IV.  Testing for Diseconomies of Scale 
We now use the incremental flows earned by funds with returns just above rating 
thresholds to test for diseconomies of scale.  We begin by estimating first-stage 
and reduced-form regressions on the full sample of mutual funds over longer in-
vestment horizons.  Then, because diseconomies of scale may differ across asset 
classes, we estimate first-stage and reduced-form regressions for different sub-
samples of mutual funds.  Finally, we compare the diseconomies of scale esti-
mates implied by our first-stage and reduced-form regressions to the disecono-
mies of scale estimates implied by standard OLS regressions. 
A.  Evidence from the Full Sample of Mutual Funds 
In Table 4, we extend the analysis in Table 3 along two dimensions.  First, rather 
than estimating first-stage regressions focused on log net flows in month t+1, we 
estimate first-stage regressions focused on cumulative log net flows over different 
investment  horizons.    Our  goal  is  to  measure  the  long-term  impact  of  rating 
thresholds on fund flows.  Second, for each first-stage regression of log net flows 
on the discontinuity variable (and full set of controls), we estimate a matching re-
duced-form regression of log net returns on the discontinuity variable (and same 
set of controls).  Given our identification assumption that flows associated with 
rating thresholds are uncorrelated with manager skill, these flows should only im-
pact fund returns through diseconomies of scale.  The reduced-form regressions 
are intended to measure this impact.  The sample is restricted to actively managed 
funds, and all standard errors are clustered on fund. 
                                                            
21 Residual flows in Figures 3A and 3B are estimated from the baseline specification in Table 3 
but omit the Morningstar within-category percentile ranking and discontinuity dummy variables.   18 
  When we restrict attention to net flows in t+1 and net returns in month 
t+1,  we  find  little  evidence  of  diseconomies  of  scale.    Estimated  incremental 
flows are between 0.41 and 0.63 log percentage points, depending on the rating 
boundaries we study, and statistically significant from zero at the 10-percent level 
and lower.  In contrast, the estimated coefficients on the discontinuity variable in 
the return regression are economically small, ranging between 0.00 and 0.01 log 
percentage  points,  and  are  not  statistically  significantly  different  from  zero  at 
conventional levels. 
  When we focus on cumulative log net flows beyond month t+1, we con-
tinue to find that Morningstar rating boundaries are associated with significant 
incremental flows.  For example, in the regressions that focus on the 3/4 star 
boundary, the incremental flows associated with the discontinuity variable (meas-
ured in month t) are 0.61 log percentage points in month t+1, 1.74 log percentage 
points through month t+6, 2.50 log percentage points through month t+12, and 
3.41  log  percentage  points  through  months  t+24.    These  estimates  imply  that 
while the effect of an extra Morningstar star in the ranking disseminated during 
month t+1 is strongest in that month, the effect of the extra star persists beyond 
the initial month.  There are numerous mechanisms that could produce this effect.  
Investors may make an initial investment in month t+1 based on the current-
month  Morningstar  rating,  and  that  initial  investment  decision  may  affect  the 
placement of subsequent investments.  Investors may also make investment deci-
sions based on an accumulation of signals received over several months.  Regard-
less  of  the  mechanism,  our  findings  about  the  timing  of  investor  reactions  to 
Morningstar are consistent with prior findings on the timing of investor reactions 
to media mentions or advertising (e.g., Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006)).  
  When we examine returns after month t+1, we continue to find little evi-
dence that the variation in fund size associated with rating thresholds affects fu-
ture returns.  The strongest evidence of scale diseconomies for the regression that   19 
stacks all four rating boundaries appears in month t+21, where funds with returns 
just above a rating threshold receive flows totally 2.09 log percentage points of 
assets and underperform their peers by 9 basis points.  The strongest evidence 
from the regressions that include only the 4/5 star boundary is in month t+15, 
where incremental flows of 2.27 log percentage points are accompanied by un-
derperformance of 12 basis points.  In neither case, however, is the underperfor-
mance statistically significant at conventional levels.  And, when we focus on 
only the 3/4 star boundary or on the 3/4 star and 4/5 star boundaries stacked, none 
of the reduced-form estimates between month t+1 and t+24 is even negative.  In 
other words, exploiting exogenous variation in fund size due to Morningstar rat-
ing thresholds, we find little evidence of diseconomies of scale.  In Figures 4A 
and 4B, we graph the contemporaneous and cumulative flow and return effects 
presented in Table 4 as a function of time. 
B.  Evidence from Different Investment Categories 
Although we find little evidence of diseconomies of scale within the full sample 
of mutual funds, we might reasonably expect the degree of diseconomies of scale 
to vary across asset classes.  For example, CHHK find their strongest evidence of 
diseconomies of scale among small-cap equity funds.  More generally, we might 
expect the strongest diseconomies of scale in asset classes with less liquidity (e.g., 
municipal bond funds) or where the inflows experienced by a typical fund are 
large relative to the investment options available (e.g., sector funds). 
  In Table 5, we re-estimate the first-stage and reduced-form regressions in 
Table 4 for different sets of mutual funds over four different investment horizons.  
We  use  the  Morningstar  category  variable  to  create  the  following  seven  non-
overlapping subsamples of mutual funds: large-cap equity; mid-cap equity; small-
cap equity; sector funds; international equity; taxable bonds; municipal bonds.  
(We exclude a small set of funds that do not fall into these categories, such as bal-
anced funds, commodities funds, and target-date retirement funds.)  We also cre-  20 
ate an “All equity” sample that combines large-cap equity, mid-cap equity, small-
cap equity, sector funds, and international equity.  We focus on cumulative log 
flows and log returns through month t+6, t+12, t+18, and t+24. 
  The estimated flow and return effects in the first column of Table 5 are for 
all funds, and match those reported in Table 4.  The other columns focus on dif-
ferent types of funds.  Looking across the seven non-overlapping subsamples, we 
see that the estimated flow effects are almost always positive, but also that the 
standard errors tend to be much larger than in the full sample.  The evidence that 
Morningstar rating thresholds impact flows is strongest for sector funds, taxable 
bond funds, and municipal bond funds.  For sector funds, the magnitudes are quite 
large, ranging from 6.19 log percentage points in month t+6 to 13.95 log percent-
age points in month t+24.  Given our need to focus on exogenous variation in 
fund size, it is hard to imagine ever finding exogenous variation in fund size be-
yond 13.95 log percentage points.  Flows effects are also statistically significant 
when we focus on the “All equity” sample, ranging from 2.65 log percentage 
points in month t+6 to 3.73 log percentage points in month t+24.  The only sub-
sample-horizon first-stage estimates that are negative are for small-cap equity in 
months t+12 through t+24. 
  Turning to the reduced-form regressions for the seven non-overlapping 
subsamples, we see that 15 of the 28 estimated coefficients are negative.  How-
ever, the only negative coefficient that is statistically different from zero at con-
ventional levels is for small-cap equity in month t+18, when the first-stage esti-
mate is also negative.  In contrast, of the 13 reduced-form coefficients that are 
positive, all eight of the estimates for mid-cap equity and municipal bonds are sta-
tistically different from zero.  The fact that we find strong flow effects for sector 
funds but no corresponding return effects argues against meaningful diseconomies 
of scale.  Our overall evidence is more consistent with modest economies of scale.   21 
 C.  A Comparison of IV and OLS Estimates of Diseconomies of Scale 
Our regression discontinuity approach allows us to directly estimate the causal 
impact of rating thresholds on flows and the causal impact of rating thresholds on 
returns.  However, we are ultimately interested in measuring the causal impact of 
flows on returns.  To obtain an IV-style estimate of the diseconomy of scales for a 
particular subsample of mutual funds and investment horizon, we scale the esti-
mated coefficient from the reduced-form by the estimated coefficient from the 
first stage.  For example, for the “All equity” sample of funds through month 
t+24,  one  log  percentage  point  in  incremental  flows  is  associated  with  incre-
mental returns that are 0.06 log percentage points lower.  (The “IV” estimate of -
0.06 equals -0.22 divided by 3.73.) 
  Table 6 reports IV estimates for different sets of mutual funds and invest-
ment horizons alongside the first-stage and reduced-form estimates (from Table 
5).  Eleven of the 25 IV estimates are negative.
22  Among the seven mutually ex-
clusive categories of funds, nine of the 19 IV estimates are negative.  However, 
the standard errors associated with many of the estimates are quite large, particu-
larly at longer time horizons and in categories with smaller inflow effects.   
  In the last several columns of Table 6, we compare our IV estimates to the 
partial correlation between fund size and fund returns that we estimate within the 
same sample using standard OLS regressions.  Specifically, the partial correlation 
for each asset class and investment horizon is estimated as the coefficient on fund 
size in a regression of future returns on the variables listed under fund characteris-
tics in Table 1, a control for past-12-month log returns, and a separate fixed effect 
for each Morningstar category each month.  Consistent with Berk and Green’s 
prediction, each of the negative IV estimates is significantly more negative than 
the corresponding OLS estimate.  However, the average IV estimate is 0.028 ver-
                                                            
22 The fact that the estimated flow effects are negative for small-cap equity funds for months t+12, 
t+18, and t+24 prompts us to drop these subsample-horizon combinations from Tables 6 and 7.   22 
sus an average OLS estimate of -0.003.  Similarly, the median IV estimate is 
0.012 versus a median OLS estimate of -0.003.  Because of the larger standard 
errors on the IV estimates, we can only reject the hypothesis that the OLS and IV 
estimates are equal in the six cases where the IV estimate is statistically signifi-
cant from zero (the p-values of the Hausman tests range from 0.02 to 0.09).  And, 
in all six of these cases, which correspond to mid-cap equity and municipal bond 
funds, the IV estimate is actually more positive than the OLS estimate. 
D.  Robustness: Estimating Diseconomies of Scale From Changes in Morningstar 
Ratings 
To test for diseconomies of scale, we have been comparing the future flows and 
future  returns  of  funds  whose  current  returns  are  near  thresholds  for  specific 
Morningstar  ratings.    This  approach  is  inherently  cross-sectional.    The  rating 
thresholds that we use in month t are those that Morningstar uses to determine its 
rating in month t.  In this section, we take a different approach and use time-series 
changes in fund ratings to test for diseconomies of scale.  When we modify our 
baseline flow regression to include both the Morningstar star rating in month t-1 
and the change in Morningstar star ratings between month t and t-1, the (unre-
ported) estimated coefficient on the change in ratings variable is 4.6% (standard 
error of 0.2%).  This suggests that gaining one star is associated with a 4.6% in-
crease in fund size over the next 12 months.  While 4.6% is approximately three 
times the full-sample estimate of 1.6% in Table 4, time-series changes in fund rat-
ings are less plausibly exogenous than the cross-sectional differences in fund rat-
ings that we exploit above. 
  To identify exogenous changes in Morningstar ratings, we exploit a sig-
nificant change in how Morningstar ratings are determined.  Through May 2002, 
fund ratings are based on rankings “across four broad asset classes (U.S. stock, 
international stock, taxable bond, and municipal bond).”  However, beginning in 
June 2002, funds are “ranked and rated within nearly 50 Morningstar Catego-  23 
ries.”
23  This change in methodology increases the ratings of the top performing 
funds in investment categories with lower average returns, and decreases the rat-
ings of the not-top-performing funds in investment categories with higher average 
returns.    The  standard  deviation  of  the  variable  measuring  changes  in  ratings 
jumps from 0.3 stars within the full sample to 0.9 stars in June 2002.  When we 
limit the flow regression sample to June 2002, the estimated coefficient on the 
change in ratings variable is again 4.6% (standard error of 1.0%).  
  The advantage of focusing on June 2002 is that, if we treat the changes in 
ratings in this month as being purely exogenous, they provide another strong first 
stage.  The disadvantage is that we are limited to a single (noisy) cross-section of 
mutual  fund  returns.    In  the  reduced-form  regression,  the  coefficient  on  the 
change in ratings variable is 0.19 log percentage points (standard error of 0.16).  
Combining the first-stage and reduced-form estimates, a one log percentage point 
increase in fund size is associated with a 0.04 log percentage point increase in 
fund returns (standard error of 0.03).  This effect is statistically and economically 
indistinguishable from the 0.01 log percentage point increase that we find for “All 
funds” in Table 6.  Therefore, regardless of whether we focus on our preferred 
regression discontinuity estimates or estimates based on changes in Morningstar 
ratings, we find little evidence that fund size erodes performance. 
E. How are Incremental Flows Invested? 
There are two reasons why incremental flows might not depress fund returns.  
First,  incremental  flows  may  be  closet  indexed  rather  than  actively  managed.  
Second, incremental flows may be used to deepen existing positions, but without 
generating enough price impact to significantly harm returns.  For example, for 
sector funds in month t+12, flows rise 8.84 log percentage points and after-fee 
returns fall 0.14 log percentage points.  The IV estimate is that a 1 percentage 
                                                            
23 See the Morningstar Press Release titled "Morningstar, Inc. to Change "Star Rating" for Funds", 
dated April 22, 2002.   24 
point increase in size is associated with a 2 basis point decrease in returns (stan-
dard error is 6 bp).  This decrease is consistent with incremental flows being in-
vested at prices that are approximately 2% too high, which may be plausible given 
that sector funds are constrained to a limited number of stocks.  
  In Table 7, we examine how incremental flows are invested.  We begin by 
estimating a reduced-form regression with the number of equity holdings as the 
dependent variable.  This specification measures the casual impact of incremental 
flows associated with the 4/5-star and 3/4-star boundaries on the number of equity 
holdings.  The sample is limited to non-speciality domestic equity funds for which 
we observe quarterly holdings.  We do not find any evidence that the number of 
holdings increases in response to incremental flows.  Instead, our findings suggest 
that incremental flows are used to deepen existing positions, which is what Pollet 
and Wilson (2008) find when they treat net flows as exogenous.
24 
  Next, we sort the sample of domestic equity funds into two groups based 
on the number of stocks they hold.  Our thinking is that funds with fewer stocks 
than the median fund (within the same investment objective in the same month) 
may be more likely to actively manage their incremental flows.  If so, funds with 
more concentrated portfolios may be the most likely to exhibit diseconomies of 
scale.  Although the standard errors are higher than in our main tables, we find 
some evidence that incremental flows are higher in funds with more concentrated 
portfolios.  This finding suggests that investors prefer to invest in more actively 
managed funds.  However, we find no evidence that funds with more concentrated 
portfolios earn lower returns than funds with less concentrated portfolios.  
F.  Summary 
Taken together, our approach tests for scale diseconomies in many places in our 
                                                            
24 In unreported regressions, we test for changes in the Cremers-Antijisto (2009) active share 
measure.  The estimated coefficients are positive, suggesting that incremental flows are driving 
portfolio weights further from benchmark weights, but the standard errors are large.   25 
data. The multiple Morningstar rating boundaries allows us to test for scale dis-
economies among funds that are experiencing net inflows (at the 4/5-star bound-
ary) and net outflows (at the 2/3-star boundary).  We can separately examine asset 
classes where Morningstar rating effects are large (e.g., sector funds and interna-
tional  equity)  or  modest  but  precisely  estimated  (large-cap  equity,  municipal 
bonds).  We can also separately examine asset classes where diseconomies of 
scale are most likely because managers have limited securities to chose from (sec-
tor funds), where there is more room to invest additional assets (large-cap equity), 
or where economies of scale may be most likely, due to large trades having lower 
trading costs (bonds).  The change in rating system in 2002 gives us a completely 
different, but still plausibly exogenous, source of identification, as well as a few 
examples of rating changes of more than one star.  None of these estimates sup-
port the view that diseconomies of scale meaningfully erode performance.
25   Fi-
nally, when we examine how incremental flows are invested by domestic equity 
funds, we find that they are used to deepen existing positions.  In liquid financial 
markets, this practice is unlikely to have a significant impact on returns. 
V.  Adjusting Performance Persistence for Diseconomies of Scale 
Finally, we turn to the important question of whether our estimated diseconomies 
of scale have an economically significant impact on estimates of performance 
persistence.  Berk and Green (2004) show that the combination of diseconomies 
of scale with endogenous fund flows will cause researchers to underestimate the 
true degree of performance persistence in the mutual fund industry.  In Table 8, 
we adjust measures of performance persistence for the causal impact of flows on 
performance.  To begin, we estimate standard OLS regressions that predict future 
                                                            
25 Our empirical strategy implicitly assumes that incremental flows are being actively managed.  
However, in the Berk-Green (2004) model, once manager skill has been exhausted, incremental 
flows will be indexed.  In the Appendix, we assume that funds with relatively more concentrated 
portfolios are more likely to actively manage incremental flows, and test whether our reduced-
form estiamtes are larger within this sample.  We do not find any evidence that they are.   26 
returns from past 12-month returns, as well as the category-by-month fixed effects 
and the control variables included in Tables 2-7.  We report the estimated coeffi-
cient on the past return measure, and its standard error, in the first set of columns.  
Within the full sample of funds, assuming a 12-month horizon, the estimated co-
efficient is 0.091.  However, this estimate will be downwardly biased if past re-
turns attract incremental flows and there are diseconomies of scale. 
  We use a similar set of regressions to predict the impact of past returns on 
log net flows.  We report the estimated coefficient on the past return measure, and 
its standard error, in the second set of columns.   For the full sample of funds, an 
additional log percentage points in returns over the past 12 months is associated 
with 0.947 log percentage points in additional flow.  The larger the diseconomies 
of scale associated with these additional flows, the greater the downward bias in 
the persistence coefficient. 
  Finally, we use the diseconomies of scale that we estimated in the prior 
section to adjust the persistence coefficient.  Specifically, we estimate the “Cor-
rected persistence coefficient” as the “Persistence coefficient” minus the “Flow 
coefficient” times the “Causal effect of flows” from Table 6.
26  For the full sam-
ple of funds and a 12-month horizon, adjusting for diseconomies of scale de-
creases the persistence correlation from 0.091 to 0.079.  If we use the standard 
errors from Table 6 to construct a 95% confidence interval for the corrected per-
sistence coefficient, we find that it ranges from 0.022 to 0.137.  We cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the “Persistence coefficient” and “Corrected persistence coef-
ficient” are equal.  However, we can reject at the 1-percent level the hypothesis 
                                                            
26 The “Persistence coefficient” is the increase in expected next-period log percentage point return 
associated with a one log percentage point increase in 12-month past returns.  The “Flow coeffi-
cient” times the “Causal effect of flows” is the expected log percentage point decrease in next pe-
riod’s return based on the expected log percentage point increase in flows times the expected dis-
economies of scale associated with the incremental flow.  The “Corrected persistence coefficient” 
removes the impact of return-induced flows on the expected log percentage point increase in next 
period’s return.   27 
that the corrected persistence coefficient is equal to 0.42, which is the value im-
plied by Berk and Green’s calibration.
27  
  Within investment categories, the corrected persistence coefficient is less 
precisely estimated.  As we possess data on virtually every U.S. mutual fund in 
operation between December 1996 and August 2009, it may prove difficult to 
significantly increase the statistical power of our tests.  Nevertheless, the upper 
bound of the 95% confidence interval is always well below 0.42, and tends to be 
lower in categories where we expect diseconomies of scale to be largest.  For sec-
tor funds the corrected persistence coefficient is slightly higher than the unad-
justed persistence coefficient (0.080 versus 0.069), but the upper bound of the 
95% confidence interval is only 0.167.  In contrast, we obtain the largest upper 
bound (0.329) for “Large-cap Equity”, a category for which we expect disecono-
mies of scale to be relatively small.  Our inference, based on our empirical strat-
egy for identifying exogenous variation in fund size, is that correcting for scale 
diseconomies does not significantly affect our view of performance persistence. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The Berk-Green model poses a serious challenge to the common academic view 
that mutual fund managers are unskilled and mutual fund investors are unsophis-
ticated.  The prediction that more skilled managers will manage larger funds also 
poses a serious challenge to existing evidence on diseconomies of scale.  We use 
a regression discontinuity approach to determine the practical importance of the 
endogeneity problem implied by the Berk-Green model.  Specifically, we use the 
discrete changes in flows associated with discrete changes in Morningstar ratings 
to identify flows that should only impact fund returns through diseconomies of 
                                                            
27 In Berk and Green's calibration exercise, managers’ skill, defined as the annualized alpha they 
would achieve in the absence of scale diseconomies, is distributed normally with mean 6.5% and 
standard deviation 6%.  Given the within-objective standard deviations of returns of 7.4 over the 
past 12 months, in the absence of scale diseconomies, this distribution of alpha would imply 
(within-objective) persistence coefficients of 0.42.      28 
scale.  On the one hand, the confidence intervals around the estimates of scale 
diseconomies implied by these plausibly exogenous flows are wider than those 
implied by cross-sectional comparisons of large and small funds.  This raises the 
possibility that diseconomies of scale are larger than previously estimated, per-
haps because more-skilled managers are more likely to manage larger funds.  On 
the other hand, the upper bounds of the confidence intervals are too low to sig-
nificantly change our views about the extent of performance persistence. 
Our results suggest that scale diseconomies are not large enough for Berk-
Green effects to overturn the conventional interpretation of the mutual fund litera-
ture's stylized facts, but this need not diminish interest in the model. The point 
that successful agents are often given more resources to manage, and these extra 
resources may overwhelm their ability to perform, is clearly more general than 
mutual funds.  The "Peter Principle" (Peter and Hull, 1969), which argues that 
managers are promoted to the point where they are no longer effective, is one 
popular expression of this general idea. 
Indeed, there are several reasons that mutual funds may be a setting in 
which these effects are particularly modest.  First, mutual funds trade in public 
financial markets that are extremely competitive and efficient, relative to other 
financial markets (such as private equity) and relative to the product markets in 
which most firms operate.  This fact should mitigate the return to all but the high-
est levels of skill.  It should also minimize the cost associated with using incre-
mental flows to deepen existing positions, which is what we find.  Second, mutual 
funds are constrained in their ability to pay for performance, and often lose cur-
rent and potential managerial talent to less regulated vehicles.  Third, mutual fund 
returns  arguably  have  a  larger  luck  component  than  performance  measures  in 
other fields, complicating the inference of skill from performance.  Fourth, to the 
extent that mutual funds are primarily marketed to unsophisticated investors, the 
reallocation of resources to more skilled managers will be less efficient than in   29 
other settings.  And finally, there are fixed costs in asset management, which may 
explain why we find little evidence of net diseconomies of scale.  Applying the 
insights of the Berk-Green model to settings where skill translates more readily 
into performance, where true performance (and not luck) is more readily matched 
with extra resources, and where extra resources have greater negative impact on 
performance is likely to be a fruitful direction for further work. 
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Appendix 
This appendix has two subsections.  First, we present tests for manipulation of the 
forcing variable.  Second, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative 
bandwidths around the rating thresholds. 
A.1.  Tests for manipulation 
A common concern in regression discontinuity design studies is that agents may 
be able to manipulate the forcing variable.  In our context, the concern would be 
that funds with more skilled managers might be better at managing their returns 
(e.g., by time varying the riskiness of their portfolios) in order to maximize their 
chances of placing just above a Morningstar boundary.  If manager skill is corre-
lated with the probability of such manipulation succeeding, this could create a 
discontinuity in skill at the boundary, confounding our use of the boundary to 
identify scale diseconomies. 
Our prior is that this type of manipulation would be very difficult to do 
successfully for several reasons.  First, the cutoffs for additional stars are not 
fixed, but depend on the performance of the other funds in a Morningstar cate-
gory.  The median fund*month is in a category with 131 other funds, and so 
tracking and forecasting the performance of the others funds that are close to a 
cutoff would be non-trivial.  Second, attempting to manage returns through the 
variation of risk (e.g., as in Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) would be difficult for 
most mutual funds, which often are restricted in their use of leverage or short sell-
ing.  Manipulating returns through discretion in the valuation of less-illiquid as-
sets like corporate or municipal bonds might be more feasible (see, e.g., Cici, 
Gibson, and Merrick, 2011), and so we run separate manipulation tests for these 
asset categories.  Third, the Morningstar ranking methodology is complicated.  
We are therefore more concerned about manipulation before June 2002, when the 
methodology became substantially more complicated, and conduct separate tests 
for the pre-2002 period.   32 
Given these concerns, we are therefore not that surprised that our tests fail 
to find evidence of successful manipulation, even in the time periods and asset 
classes where our concerns are the greatest.  We conduct three types of tests:  1) 
McCrary (2008) tests for discontinuities in the density of the forcing variables at 
rating cutoffs, 2) tests for discontinuities in the control variables at the rating cut-
offs, and 3) fund-level tests for persistence in the discontinuity variable (control-
ling for the forcing variable).  The first two tests are fairly standard in regression 
discontinuity studies, while the third addresses a form of manipulation that would 
be particularly problematic for our methodology. 
A.1.1  McCrary tests for discontinuities 
McCrary outlines a simple test for manipulation of the forcing variable.  If agents 
successfully  manipulate  the  forcing  variable  to  just  exceed  a  cutoff,  then  we 
should observe a discontinuity in the density of the variable at the cutoff.  As suc-
cessful manipulators would be more common just above the cutoff, to the extent 
that skill in manipulation was correlated with skill in fund management, this could 
create a discontinuity in skill at the cutoffs, and thus be a threat to identification. 
The McCrary test involves defining a bandwidth, calculating the number 
of observations in each bin, and testing whether the number of observations in 
each bin changes discretely at the boundary.  Morningstar ratings are defined 
based on within-category percentile rankings on risk-adjusted returns.  Because 
the density of a percentile variable cannot vary, we test for discontinuities in the 
density of Morningstar's measure of risk-adjusted returns.  For simplicity, we test 
for discontinuities at the boundaries of the 3, 5 and 10-year star ratings, without 
considering whether a boundary is pivotal for a fund's overall rating.  As in the 
main analysis, we restrict attention to a fund's largest share class, which for the 
reasons discussed above is the rating funds are most likely to have an interest in 
manipulating. 
In  order  to  aggregate  results  over  investment  categories  with  different   33 
standard deviations of returns, we first standardize returns into z-scores within 
each objective*month.  If returns were normally distributed, the 4 cutoffs would 
be at z-scores of approximately -1.28, -0.45, 0.45, and 1.28.  In practice, the aver-
age and standard deviation z-score boundaries are -1.13, -0.29, 0.46, and 1.22, 
reflecting some excess kurtosis and negative skew.  The standard deviations are 
0.22, 0.15, 0.15, and 0.24, reflecting some variation around these averages across 
objective*months. 
After identifying the funds that are just above and below each boundary, 
we place funds into bins that are 0.01 wide in z-score space and begin just after 
the first fund on each side of the boundary.  Figure A1 plots the share of funds in 
the 10 bins on either side of the four star boundaries for the 3-year ratings (the 
time horizon which have the largest sample size).  The standard normal density is 
shown for comparison.  There is no evidence of a discontinuity in density, and 
this is confirmed by statistically insignificant coefficients on a discontinuity vari-
able in a regression with a local linear control.  Results are similar for the 5-year 
and 10-year ratings.  They are also similar when we split the sample based on 
pre/post-2002 and bond/stock funds. 
A.1.2.  Tests for discontinuities in control and lagged dependent variables 
A second commonly used test for manipulation of the forcing variable is to test 
whether control and lagged dependent variables exhibit discontinuities.  Table A1 
replicates the regressions in Table 3 with alternative dependent variables.  While 
most of the control variables covary with the forcing variable, there is no evidence 
discontinuities at the rating boundaries.  The fact that there are no discontinuities 
in these pre-determined observable variables increases our confidence that there is 
also no discontinuity in manager skill, the key unobservable variable our approach 
is attempting to control for.   34 
A.1.3.  Tests for persistence in the discontinuity variable 
As a final test for successful manipulation of Morningstar ratings, we ask whether 
certain funds are able to persistently place just above rating thresholds.  Morning-
star ratings are based on risk-adjusted returns over multi-period windows (36, 60, 
and 120 months), and so the month-to-month change in a fund's percentile rank-
ing is fairly small (with standard deviations of 6.6, 5.5, and 4.7 percentile points, 
respectively).  As a result, these tests require controlling for the forcing variable 
non-linearly. 
To see this, suppose that if a fund's percentile ranking change is drawn 
randomly each month from a p.d.f. f(x), with a peak at x=0.  The probability that a 
fund will exceed a threshold next month will be given by F(z), where z is the cur-
rent-month distance above the threshold and F is the c.d.f.  Given the peak in f() 
at 0, this probability F(z) will be non-linear in z with a slope that peaks at zero.  
Especially if the spread in f() is small, controlling for the current-month forcing 
variable linearly when predicting the future discontinuity could lead one to falsely 
conclude that there is persistence in the discontinuity variable. 
As a result, we use a logit model to predict the future discontinuity vari-
able as a function of the current-month discontinuity and forcing variable, as well 
as the control variables used in Table 3.  Table A2 reports the coefficients on the 
current-month discontinuity and forcing variable for models predicting the dis-
continuity variable at the 1, 3, and 6 month horizon.  In general, the coefficients 
on the current-month discontinuity variable are statistically and economically in-
significant.  In particular, we can usually rule out that being above the boundary 
this month raises the future probability by more than a 2-percentile increment in 
the forcing variable. 
A.2  Robustness to bandwidth 
It is common in regression discontinuity studies to check the robustness of the 
results to alternative choices about the bandwidth analyzed around the disconti-  35 
nuities.  The results presented above use a bandwidth of 5 percentiles in either 
direction of the cutoff for a Morningstar rating.  Table A3 replicates selected re-
sults from Tables 4 using alternative bandwidths. 
The results do not appear sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.  Because 
narrower bandwidths reduce the number of observations included, standard errors 
rise, particularly if the bandwidth is narrowed to 2 percentiles.  Likewise, standard 
errors decline slightly as the bandwidth widens.  The main conclusions are robust 
to bandwidth:  1) star boundaries are accompanied by discontinuities in flows, 2) 
discontinuities in flows are larger for the 4/5-star boundary, and 3) discontinuities 
in flows are rarely accompanied by discontinuities in future returns. 
 